The paper studies a class of experience good models in a new way. We focus on signaling games close to Akerlof's market for lemons, in which a seller sells a good to a buyer, who ignores the quality of the good during the transaction. In this context, we first establish some properties of the mixed Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Then we turn to the concept of bestreply matching (BRM) developed by Droste, Kosfeld & Voorneveld (2002 , 2003 for games in normal form. BRM equilibria respect a consistency which is different from the Nash equilibrium one: in a BRM equilibrium, the probability assigned by a player to a pure strategy is linked to the number of times the opponents play the strategies to which this pure strategy is a best reply. We extend this logic to signaling games in extensive form and apply the new obtained concept to our experience good models. This new concept leads to a very simple rule of behavior, which is consistent, different from the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium behavior, different from Akerlof's result, and can be socially efficient.
Introduction
The paper studies experience good models in a new way, by applying the concept of best reply matching developed by Droste, Kosfeld & Voorneveld (2002 ,2003 . The signaling games under study are close to Akerlof's market for lemons, in which a seller sells a good to a buyer, who ignores the quality during the transaction. In section 2 we look for the characteristics of the mixed Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). We namely focus on the fact that no type of seller can play more than three prices in a PBE in which the seller earns a positive payoff regardless of the sold quality. This characteristic eliminates simple rules of behavior which respect a limited rationality. That is why we turn, in section 3, to the BestReply Matching (BRM) concept developed by Voorneveld (2002, 2003) . A BRM equilibrium respects a consistency which is different from the Nash equilibrium one. In a few words, Droste & al.(2003) and Kosfeld & al. (2002) pursue the notion of rationalizability earlier developed by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) : in a BRM equilibrium, the probability that a player assigns to a pure strategy is linked to the number of times the opponents play the strategies to which this pure strategy is a best reply. Droste & al.' s concept is developed for normal form games. Therefore, in section 4, given that we are studying signaling games, we modify the definition of BRM in order to take into account the decentralized decision process allowed by the extensive form game approach.
We explain why the two versions of the concept differ. In section 5 we apply Droste & al.'s normal form concept to some games close to Akerlof's market for lemons. In section 6 we apply our extensive form concept (called local BRM equilibrium) to the same games and compare the obtained results. In section 7 we generalize the results obtained in section 6. We study a model with n prices p 1 …p n , such that the seller whose good is of quality t i can only earn a positive payoff by selling the good at prices p j , with j higher or equal than i. In this model the local BRM equilibrium is a very easy profile of strategies: each quality t i is sold at each price p j , with j higher or equal than i, with a same probability, and the consumer accepts each price with the probability 1 divided by the number of qualities possibly sold at this price. This behavior, which is far from a PBE behavior, is not only consistent with the BRM logic, but it respects common sense. Therefore it is easy to learn and to adopt. Moreover we show in section 8 that it can lead to a social surplus that is higher than the one obtained with Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Section 9 extends the BRM concepts by allowing a more diversified behavior in case of indifference; we establish the link between the new concepts and the Nash equilibria. Section 10 concludes on further developments. It namely comes back to Akerlof's result and establishes the existence of BRM equilibria.
Akerlof's market for lemons, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and limited rationality
The studied context is an experience good model close to Akerlof's context. So the studied game is a signaling game with a seller and a buyer. The seller wants to sell a car to the buyer.
The car can be of different qualities. We introduce a finite number of qualities t i , with i from 1 to n, and t i <t i+1 for i from 1 to n-1. The seller' s reservation price for a good of quality t i is h i , i from 1 to n, with h i <h i+1 for i from 1 to n-1. The seller sets a price for her good. The buyer observes the price and accepts or refuses the transaction. The buyer' s reservation price for a good of quality t i is H i , i from 1 to n, with H i <H i+1 for i from 1 to n-1. The buyer ignores the quality during the transaction, but has a prior probability distribution over the qualities, that is common knowledge of both players; the probability distribution assigns probability ρ i to the quality t i , with 0< ρ i <1 for i from 1 to n and ρ = n 1 i i =1. It is assumed that H i > h i for any i from 1 to n, in order to make profitable trade for both players possible. We also introduce the assumption: 
Assumption (a) is the heart assumption of Akerlof' s comment (see below) . Assumption (b) namely ensures that H i <h i+1 <H i+1 for any i from 1 to n-1. It also ensures that, if each type of seller plays a unique price, this price being higher or equal to her reservation price, then the consumer is better off accepting a price p with h j <p<H j if and only if only t j plays p.
The symbolic representation of the studied experience good model (with two qualities) is given in figure 1 .
Legend of figure 1: A and R mean that the consumer accepts (A) or refuses (R) the trade.
The first, respectively the second coordinate of each vector of payoffs, is the seller's, respectively the consumer's payoff.
Let us recall that in this game Akerlof's comment goes as follows:
If trade occurs, the car is sold at a unique price, regardless of its quality, because any type of seller wants to sell her car at the highest price. So imagine that the observed price is p, with h j ≤p<h j+1 , j higher or equal to 2. Only qualities lower or equal to t j can be sold at price p. It follows that the expected quality of the sold car is 
Figure 1 . Yet this price, by assumption (a), is lower than h j and therefore lower than p. So trade will not occur at price p. As a consequence, trade can only occur at a price p lower than h 2 . This price is necessarily assigned to the quality t 1 and will be accepted, provided it is lower or equal to H 1 . Therefore the worst quality throws all the other qualities out of the market.
Yet Akerlof's reasoning is a pure strategy reasoning. As soon as one switches to mixed strategies, trade does not necessarily occur at a unique price. Many prices can coexist on the market and this coexistence allows all qualities to be sold on the market, even in a context that satisfies assumption (b).
Let us give more insights into the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the studied signaling game.
Throughout the paper we use the following notations: π i (p j ) is the probability that the seller of type t i (i.e. whose quality is t i ) plays p j ; q(p j ) is the probability that the consumer accepts the price p j .
Proposition 1: existence of PBE
The studied experience good model has a huge number of PBE.
For example, there exists an infinite number of mixed strategies PBE, in which the seller of type t i plays the prices p i * and p i+1 *, respectively with probabilities 1-π i (p i+1 *) and π i (p i+1 *), with i from 1 to n-1; t n plays the price p n * with probability 1. p 1 *=H 1 ; h i <p i *<H i for i from 2 to n (and therefore p i *< p i+1 * for i from 1 to n-1).
The buyer accepts p 1 * with probability 1 and accepts each price p i * , i from 2 to n, with probability q(p i *). π i (p i+1 *) , i from 1 to n-1, and q(p i *), i from 1 to n, are defined by:
The buyer assigns each price p different from the equilibrium prices, with H i-1 ≤ p< H i , to t i-2 , for i from 3 to n, and each price p, with p<H 2 , to t 1 . Hence he refuses the trade at each non equilibrium price higher than H 1 . He accepts all the out of equilibrium prices lower than H 1 .
Proof: see appendix 1
Given that both p i * and p i+1 * are higher than h i for i from 1 to n-1 and that p n is higher than h n , proposition 1 ensures that, as soon as the players are allowed to play mixed strategies, trade can occur with positive probabilities at different prices and the seller's payoff can be positive at a PBE regardless of the quality of her good (for more precisions on these equilibria see Umbhauer 2007) .
The PBE of the studied experience good model share some properties which are given in proposition 2.
Proposition 2
In every PBE in which each type of seller gets a positive payoff:
-each type of seller plays at most 3 prices with a positive probability;
-if t i plays 3 prices p, p' , and p", with p<p' <p", then p' =H i ;
-if t i plays a price p different from H i , then p is also played with positive probability by the adjacent type t i-1 or t i+1 ;
-at most 2n-1 different prices are played in a PBE path;
-the buyer' s payoff is null.
In every PBE the buyer' s payoff is null.
Proof: see appendix 2
The property we focus on is the fact that each type t i can at most play two prices different from H i . Let us illustrate the consequence of this fact on the following simplified experience good model:
There are 3 types of quality, t 1 , t 2 and t 3 , with t 1 <t 2 <t 3 and only 3 possible prices, p 1 , p 2 and p 3 , with h 1 < p 1 < H 1 < h 2 < p 2 <H 2 < h 3 < p 3 < H 3 . We suppose that the game satisfies assumption (b), that no player plays a weakly dominated strategy, hence that no type of seller plays a price lower than her reservation price and that the consumer always accepts p 1 .
It follows that the studied game is given in figure 2 . each of the three prices p 1 , p 2 and p 3 with the same probability 1/3, t 2 plays each of the two prices p 2 , p 3 with probability ½, t 3 plays p 3 with probability 1, the consumer accepts p 1 with probability 1, p 2 with probability ½ and p 3 with probability 1/3 (cf. figure 2 ).
Yet this easy profile of strategies is not silly; it satisfies a limited rationality. As a matter of fact it is not silly for t 1 to play all the three prices with the same probability. Indeed, by 
Figure 2
consumer consumer comparing p 1 and p 3 , she observes that it is more interesting to play p 3 when p 3 is accepted, which encourages her to put a higher probability on p 3 than on p 1 ; but she also knows that the consumer is more incited to refuse p 3 than p 1 , which discourages her to put a higher probability on p 3 than on p 1 . So, all in all, it is not silly to play both prices with the same probability. Given that she can make a similar reasoning by comparing p 1 and p 2 and p 2 and p 3 , it not silly to finally assign the same probability 1/3 to each of the three prices. And of course a similar reasoning can lead her to assign the same probability ½ to p 2 and p 3 when she is of type t 2 . The consumer's behavior also finds an easy justification. He prefers accepting p 2 when it is played by t 2 , but he prefers refusing it when it is played by t 1 ; hence, given that only one of two configurations encourages him to buy the good, he buys it with probability ½. Similarly, the consumer prefers accepting p 3 if it is played by t 3 , but prefers refusing it if it is played by t 1 and if it is played by t 2 ; hence, given that only one of three configurations encourages him to buy the good, he buys it with probability 1/3.
It derives that this easy behavior satisfies limited rationality even if, of course, it does not respect Bayesian rationality. This easy behavior has another advantage. It can easily be generalized to a higher number of types and prices. So it can become an applied rule of behavior, because it is easy to learn and therefore to adopt, regardless of the number of prices and types.
What is more, this simple rule of behavior respects a strong consistency, the best-reply matching one, to which we turn in the following sections. Let G=(N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N ) be a game. A mixed strategy p is a (normal form) BRM equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and for every pure strategy s i ∈S i , :
In a BRM equilibrium, the probability assigned to a pure strategy is linked to the number of times the opponents play the strategies to which this pure strategy is a best reply. So, if player i' s opponents play s -i with probability p -i (s -i ), and if the set of player i' s best responses to s -i is the subset of pure strategies B i (s -i ), then each strategy of this subset is played with the probability p -i (s -i ) divided by the cardinal of B i (s -i ).
This concept carries on the concept of rationalizability developed by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) , according to which a strategy s i is rationalizable if there exists a pure strategy profile s -i played by the opponents to which s i is a best response. Droste, Kosfeld and
Voorneveld go further: they observe that, if the opponents often play s -i , then s i often becomes the best response, and therefore they argue that it is rational (rationalizable) for player i to often play s i . More precisely, Droste & al require that, if s -i is played with probability p -i , s i should be played with the same probability (if s i is the only best reply to s -i ). Given that the same condition is checked for each pure strategy, each player's probability distribution (on pure strategies) is justified by the opponents' probability distributions, which ensures a strong behavior consistency.
This consistency is very different from the consistency of the Nash equilibrium concept, albeit the intersection between both concepts is not empty 2 . To see why, look at the signaling game given in figure 3.
2 Especially each strong Nash equilibrium is a BRM equilibrium. In fact, in a strong Nash equilibrium s*, each strategy s i * is played with probability 1 and constitutes the unique best reply to the strategies of the other players. So according to the BRM logic, each strategy s i * has to be played with the probability assigned to s -i *, i.e. 1, which ensures that s* is also a BRM equilibrium (see also section 9 for more intersection). The only PBE, and also the only Nash equilibria, of the game in figure 3 are such that player 1 always plays m 1 regardless of type and player 2 assigns to r 1 a probability between 0.6 and 2/3. It follows that the unique PBE outcome is the couple (2,2).
The normal form of the game is given by matrix 1. One observes in this matrix -but also directly on the extensive form of the game-that player 1 is best off playing m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 each time player 2 plays r 1 and that she is best off playing m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 each time player 2 plays r 2 .
Hence the BRM consistency requires that player 1 plays m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 as often as player 2 plays r 1 , i.e. that she assigns to m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 a probability p 2 equal to the probability q that player 2 assigns to r 1 ; in the same way she has to assign to m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 a probability p 3 equal to the probability 1-q that player 2 assigns to r 2 . means that player 1's strategy is a best reply to player 2's strategy, B 2 means that player 2's strategy is a best reply to player 1's strategy.
We get the system of equations:
The unique solution of this system is p 2 = p 3 = q= 1-q= 0.5, p 1 =p 4 =0.
Hence, in the BRM equilibrium, player 1 plays m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 half of time and m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 half of time and player 2 plays r 1 half of time and r 2 half of time.
This solution is very far from the Nash equilibrium solution. Let us explain the reason for this difference. The above BRM equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium because in a Nash equilibrium, a player reacts to the mean behavior of the opponents. So, according to Nash's logic, if player 2 plays r 1 half of time and r 2 half of time, player 1 plays m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 with probability 1. By contrast, according to the BRM logic, player 1 takes into account that half of time, player 2 plays r 1 with probability 1, in which case the best response is m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 , and the other half of time, player 2 plays r 2 with probability 1, in which case the best response is m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 ; it follows that half of time her optimal behavior is m 1 /t 1 m 2 /t 2 and half of time it is m 2 /t 1 m 1 /t 2 .
Let us also insist on the fact that the probabilities in the BRM equilibrium have nothing to do with the probabilities of a mixed Nash equilibrium. In a BRM equilibrium a player i assigns a high probability to a pure strategy s i if it is often a best reply (i.e. if the opponents often play the strategy profile to which s i is a best reply). By contrast, in a mixed Nash equilibrium, the probability a player i assigns to s i has nothing to do with the frequency with which s i is a best reply: indeed, when she plays two strategies s i and s i ' with positive probability, she is indifferent between both strategies and could assign any probability (summing to 1) to s i and s i' : in fact, the only role of the probability assigned to s i is to justify the strategies of the opponents of player i.
Let us finally observe that, in this game, the BRM equilibrium ensures a mean payoff 2/2+5/4 >2 to t 1 , a mean payoff of 2/2 +3/4 <2 to t 2 (hence a mean payoff 2 to player 1) and a payoff 11/4 >2 to player 2. It follows that, in this game, player 1 gets the same expected payoff in both the BRM equilibrium and the (PBE) Nash equilibria and player 2 gets a higher payoff in the BRM equilibrium than in the (PBE) Nash equilibria. This fact does not prove that in general BRM equilibria lead to higher payoffs, it just illustrates that both concepts are highly different and can therefore lead to completely different issues and payoffs.
Best-reply matching in a signaling game: the local approach
We propose in this section to apply the BRM logic in a more extensive form -decentralizedway. We know justify the play of each action at each information set. To this aim we study the game of figure 3 with local strategies. So we again call q the probability assigned by player 2 to r 1 but we call π 1 , respectively π 2 , the probability assigned by t 1 to m 2 and the probability assigned by t 2 to m 2 .
One observes that t 1 is best off playing m 2 each time player 2 plays r 2 , which leads her to play m 2 as often as player 2 plays r 2 , hence π 1 =1-q. t 2 is best off playing m 2 each time player 2 plays r 1 , which leads her to play m 2 as often as player 2 plays r 1 , hence π 2 =q . Reciprocally, player 2 is best off playing r 1 if t 1 plays m 2 and t 2 plays m 1 or if t 1 plays m 2 and t 2 plays m 2 . r 1 is one of the two best responses if t 1 plays m 1 and t 2 plays m 1 . It follows that q= π 1 (1-π 2 )+ π 1 π 2 + (1-π 1 )(1-π 2 )/2. Finally player 2 is best off playing r 2 each time t 1 plays m 1 and t 2 plays m 2 . r 2 is one of the two best responses if t 1 plays m 1 and t 2 plays m 1 . It follows that 1-q=
Hence we get the system of equations
The unique solution of this system is: π 1 =0.44, π 2 =0.56, q=0.56.
Before commenting this result, let us give the definition of the local BRM equilibrium in signaling games, we applied in the above example.
Definition 2: Local BRM equilibrium in signaling games
Let G be a finite signaling game in extensive form. Player 1 can be of n types t i , i from 1 to n, and chooses a message in a finite set M(t i ). M= Let us now comment the difference between the normal form and the local approach of BRM. In the game of figure 3, the normal form approach led to q=0.5 and p 1 =p 4 =0, p 2 =p 3 =0.5.The Kuhn equivalent behavioral strategies are given by π 1 =0.5, π 2 =0.5 and q=0.5.
It follows that the local BRM equilibrium, π 1 =0.44, π 2 =0.56 and q=0.56, albeit nor far from the normal form BRM equilibrium, is different. It follows:
Proposition 2
The local BRM equilibria and the normal form BRM equilibria do not necessarily lead to the same issues.
The reason for this difference can be understood by looking at the four configurations given in figures 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d.
The configurations given in figures 3a and 3d, respectively in figures 3b and 3c, occur with probability 0 (p 1 =p 4 =0), respectively 0.5 (p 2 =p 3 =0.5) in the normal form approach, whereas they all occur with a probability close to 0.25 in the local approach. To understand this difference, look at the configuration given in figure 3d , in which both t 1 and t 2 play m 2 . This configuration is impossible in the normal approach (p 4 =0) because there exists no pure strategy of player 2 such that both t 1 and t 2 are best off playing m 2 . By contrast, this configuration makes sense in the local decentralized approach. As a matter of fact t 1 rigthly plays m 2 with probability 0.44 because player 2 plays r 2 with the same probability. And t 2 rightly plays m 2 with probability 0.56 because player 2 plays r 1 with the same probability. So it automatically follows that the event "both t 1 and t 2 play m 2 " is observed with probability 0.44x0.56, which is far from 0.
In fact, the normal form links the actions taken at each decision node of player 1 and therefore looks for actions by player 2 that justify a profile of decisions of player 1. Hence, in the normal form -centralized-approach, the actions played at x 1 and x 2 have to be justified by the same player 2's action. By contrast, in the local, decentralized approach, the action played by t 1 is justified by a player 2's action r and the action played by t 2 is justified by a player 2's action r', and r' can be different from r. To our mind this latter fact is not problematic in a BRM context. The BRM logic nowhere requires that an action and the actions that justify it have to be played at the same moment. Hence t 1 and t 2 can both play m 2 (with probability 0.44 and 0.56) despite player 2 will not play r 2 and r 1 at the same moment, because player 2 will actually select both actions with probability 0.44 and 0.56. To our point of view, his fact advocates for the local BRM approach.
In the following sections we will apply both approaches of BRM to the experience good model.
Normal form best-reply matching in experience good models
Let us first consider the simplified model that satisfies assumption (b), with 2 types, t 1 , t 2 , and only two possible prices, p 1 and p 2 , with h 1 < p 1 < H 1 < h 2 < p 2 <H 2 . Let us also suppose 
that no player plays a weakly dominated strategy, so that t 2 only plays p 2 and the consumer always accepts p 1 . The studied game is given in figure 4 .
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The normal form approach leads to the best reply table 2, where p i , i from 1 to 2, are the probabilities that the seller assigns to her pure strategies and q i , i from 1 to 2, are the probabilities that the consumer assigns to his pure strategies. Table 2 The system of equations becomes:
Therefore p 1 = p 2 =q 1 =q 2 = ½ .
We recall that π i (p j ) is the probability that a seller of type t i plays p j and q(p j ) is the probability that the consumer accepts p j . The Kuhn behavioral equivalent strategies of the above strategy profile become:
q(p 1 ) = 1, q(p 2 ) = q 1 = 0.5.
Hence t 1 plays both prices with probability ½ and the consumer accepts the high price with probability ½. 
Figure 4
Let us now consider the simplified model that satisfies assumption (b), with 3 types, t 1 , t 2 and t 3 and only 3 possible prices, p 1 , p 2 and p 3 , with h 1 < p 1 < H 1 < h 2 < p 2 <H 2 < h 3 < p 3 < H 3 Let us again suppose that no player plays a weakly dominated strategy, so that no type of seller plays a price lower than her reservation price and so that the consumer always accepts p 1 . It follows that the studied game is given in figure 3 ( Table 3 The system of equations is given by: The Kuhn equivalent behavioral strategies are: π 1 (p 1 ) = 2/7, π 1 (p 2 ) = 2/7, π 1 (p 3 ) = 3/7 π 2 (p 2 ) = 3/7, π 2 (p 3 ) = 4/7, π 3 (p 3 ) = 1 q(p 1 )= 1, q(p 2 )= 3/7, q(p 3 )= 3/7.
It immediately follows:

Proposition 3
The BRM equilibrium and the PBE (see proposition 2) are different. The main difference is that t 1 does not only play p 1 and p 2 , but she also plays p 3 with a significant probability.
This difference is linked to another one. In a PBE, the probability of accepting a price strictly decreases in the price. This fact is no longer true with the BRM concept (q(p 2 )=q(p 3 )). More generally, in a model with n types of seller, each type t i , i from 1 to n, in a normal form BRM equilibrium, plays each price p j , j from i to n, with a positive probability (a fact which is impossible in any PBE with a positive payoff for the seller cf. proposition 2).
Proof: see Appendix 3
Local best-reply matching in experience good models
We now study the same models than in section 4, but with the local BRM concept. In the first model (given in figure 4) Hence, in the two type game, we get exactly the same result regardless of the employed BRM concept.
Unfortunately, this equality of results does not generalize.
Indeed, in the second model (given in figure 3 ), one obtains:
given that t 1 ' s best response is p 3 each time the consumer accepts p 3 and it is p 2 each time the consumer refuses p 3 but accepts p 2 . With the remaining probability (not written here) t 1 plays
given that t 2 ' s best reply is to play p 3 each time p 3 is accepted and also each time both p 3 and p 2 are refused. In the latter case, both p 2 and p 3 are best replies, which explains the division by 2. t 2 plays p 2 with the remaining probability (not written here).
because accepting p 2 is optimal if only t 2 plays p 2 or if neither t 1 nor t 2 play p 2 . In the latter case, player 2 can also refuses p 2 , which explains the division by 2. The consumer refuses p 2 with the remaining probability.
because accepting p 3 is optimal only if t 1 and t 2 do not play p 3 . The consumer rejects p 3 with the remaining probability.
Solving the system of equations leads to:
Let us comment this result.
First, even if the seller' s behavior is not far from the one in the normal form game (2/7, 2/7, 3/7 become 1/3,1/3,1/3 and 3/7 becomes ½), the results obtained in the extensive form are different from the ones obtained in the normal form. This difference clearly derives from the decentralization which is possible in the extensive form and impossible in the normal form.
Second, the obtained result is worth of interest in that the obtained behaviors are quite simple: t 1 can play 3 prices and plays each of them with probability 1/3, t 2 can play 2 prices and plays each of them with probability ½, t 3 can only play one price and of course plays it with probability 1; the buyer accepts p 1 -which can only be played by t 1 -with probability 1, he accepts p 2 -which can be played by 2 types-with probability ½, and he accepts p 3 -which can be played by 3 types-with probability 1/3. So we precisely obtain the simple behavior we talked about in section 2. It follows that this easy behavior for which we found a limited rationality explanation, respects a strong consistency, the best-reply matching one.
What is more, we prove in the next section that this behavior can be generalized.
Generalization: a simple behavior rule
In this section we prove that the above behavior generalizes as soon as one smoothly changes the behavior of the consumer when he is indifferent between buying and not buying.
We indeed agree with Droste & al.(2003) we now suppose that, instead of accepting and refusing p i with the probability of the event "no type lower or equal to t i plays p i " divided by 2, the consumer accepts p i only with the probability of this event divided by i. Given that i is the cardinal of the set of types who can play p i , we introduce in some way a kind of risk aversion that grows with higher prices. This is not a silly assumption but we admit that we only introduce it in order to get the generalization of the result obtained in the three type case.
The system of equations in the general case becomes:
]/ (n-i+1) for i from 2 to n-1
]/ (n-i+1) for i from 2 to n-1 and k from i+1 to n-1
It is easy to check that the solution for this system of equations is given by:
Proposition 4
In the n type case, the BRM behavior is given by: π i (p j )= 1/(n-i+1) for i from 1 to n and j from i to n.
q(p j )= 1/j for j from 1 to n.
In other words, each type plays each available price with the same probability and the consumer accepts each price with the probability 1 divided by the number of types who can play this price.
Given that this behavior can also be explained with limited rationality (cf. section 2), we claim that it is difficult to find a more easy behavior that satisfies the same amount of consistency.
It follows that we conclude that it would be worth testing this behavior experimentally, in order to see if it is sometimes adopted.
Best-reply matching and social surplus
The preceding behavior rule is not only simple and consistent but it can lead to positive payoffs for both the consumer and the seller, at least if the number of types is low.
Proposition 5
In the simplified experience good model with two types and two prices p 1 and p 2 examined in sections 5 and 6, best reply matching can lead to positive payoffs for both the consumer and the seller. Moreover the social surplus can be higher than the highest PBE social surplus in the experience good model with two types examined in section 2.
We now turn to the BRM equilibrium in the simplified experience good model with 2 prices p 1 and p 2 examined in sections 5 and 6. We know that in this case the normal form BRM concept and the local BRM concept lead to the same result, i. Moreover it is easy to find values for p 1 and p 2 that lead to positive payoffs for both players, both payoffs being higher that the highest PBE payoffs. For example, for p 1 very close to 50 and p 2 =62, the consumer surplus is equal to 2/4 (>0) and the seller surplus is equal to 8.5/4 (>5/7).
It follows that the BRM approach can be socially efficient .This fact is not astonishing given that Nash equilibria (and PBE) are not necessary Pareto efficient and given that the Nash equilibrium consistency and the BRM equilibrium consistency are different.
Best-Reply Matching and behavior in case of indifference
An interesting development of BRM concerns the treatment of indifference. In both definitions of BRM (normal form and local), a player is supposed to share equally a probability between all the strategies that are best responses. For example, suppose that A 1 and B 1 are best replies for player 1 only if player 2 plays C 2 . Suppose also that player 2 plays C 2 with probability q. In that case, the BRM concept assigns probability q/2 to A 1 and to B 1 .
Yet there is no reason to divide equally q between A 1 and B 1 (this fact led us to choose another division to get the result in proposition 4).
More precisely, one should examine the whole set of equilibrium possibilities, in which the probability assigned to A 1 is p, with 0≤p≤q , the probability assigned to B 1 being 1-p. So we get the following new versions of BRM equilibria.
Definition 3: New normal form BRM equilibrium
Let G=(N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N ) be a game. A mixed strategy p is a new normal form BRM equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and for every pure strategy s i ∈S i , : 
Definition 4: New local BRM equilibrium in signaling games
Let G be a finite signaling game in extensive form. Player 1 can be of n types t i , i from 1 to n, and chooses a message in a finite set M(t i ). M(t i ). M= 
Proposition 6
Each pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a new normal form BRM equilibrium. Each pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a signaling game is a new local BRM equilibrium.
Proof:
Consider a pure strategy Nash equilibrium s*. For each player i, s i * is a (possibly among others) best reply to s -i *. Given that s -i * is played with probability 1, it is now possible, in a new normal form BRM equilibrium, to put probability 1 on s i * (even if s i * is not the unique best reply). It automatically follows that s* is a new BRM equilibrium, hence that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is included in the set of new normal form BRM equilibria.
Consider a pure strategy Nash equilibrium s* in a signaling game. s* bijectively corresponds to a behavioral Nash equilibrium π*= (π 1 (.)*,π 2 (.)*). For each type t i , * (.) i t π assigns probability 1 to a message m i (because s* is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium), m i being a best reply (possibly among others) to π 2 (.)*. Given that player 2, after each message m, assigns probability 1 to only one response (because s* is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium), the new local BRM concept allows t i to put probability 1 on m i because player 2 assigns probability 1 to all the played responses. Reciprocally, for each possible message m, π 2m (.)* assigns probability 1 to one response r m after the message m. Given that r m is a best reply (possibly among others) after m to π 1 (.)*= (.)*) (.)*,..., ( n i t t π π , given that * (.) i t π assigns probability 1 to the unique message played by t i , it follows that the new local BRM concept allows to put probability 1 on r m . It derives that π*, and therefore s*, is a new local BRM equibrium. So the set of pure Nash equilibria is included in the set of new local BRM equilibria.
But of course, this extension does in no way bring nearer together mixed Nash equilibria and BRM equilibria given that the consistency of both criteria differs.
Conclusion: existence and further developments, a comeback to Akerlof's result
Let us first check the consequences of the above extension on the experience good model.
Unfortunately this extension is not sufficient for the set of normal form BRM equilibria to become Kuhn equivalent to the set of local BRM equilibria.
Let us come back to the simplified experience good model given in figure 3.
According to where α,β,γ ∈ [0, 1].
The new local BRM concept leads to the set of equations II:
The Kuhn equivalent behavioral strategies to the mixed strategies (p, q) 
In other terms, the intersection of the sets of new normal form and new local BRM equilibria only contains one equilibrium, which, surprisingly, is compatible with Akerlof's result i.e.:
only the lowest quality is sold on the market.
More generally it is easy to establish the following result:
Proposition 7
In the general n-type case (described in section 7), Akerlof's result is a new normal form and a new local BRM equilibrium. More precisely, the strategy profile such that the seller sets the price p 1 if she is of type t 1 and the price p n if she is of type t i , i from 2 to n, and the consumer only accepts the price p 1, is a new normal form and a new local BRM equilibrium.
Proof:
It is immediate that the strategy profile such that the seller sets the price p 1 if she is of type t 1 and the price p n if she is of type t i , i from 2 to n, and the consumer only accepts the price p 1 , is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It follows from proposition 6 that it is a new normal form and a new BRM equilibrium.
It is interesting to observe that the values of the parameters δ m and δ r , in case of indifference, that ensure that the tested strategy profile is a new local BRM equilibrium, are the ones given in bold letters below.
=0 for i from 2 to n-1
] 0 = 0 for i from 2 to n-1 and k from i+1 to n-1
Of course, this result should not make forget that in the two type case, the intersection of new normal form and local BRM equilibria does not shrink to Akerlof's result, because in this model both sets of equilibria are equal, and do only contain the profile which leads t 2 to play each of the two prices half of time and the consumer to accept the high price half of time.
Let us now turn to the question of existence of BRM equilibria. Droste & al.(2003) proved the existence of normal form BRM. It follows:
Proposition 8: existence
Each signaling game has at least one local BRM equilibrium.
Each game in normal form has at least one new normal form BRM equilibrium, and each signaling game has at least one new local BRM equilibrium
Proof:
Looking for local BRM equilibria in the extensive form of the signaling game is equivalent to looking for normal form BRM equilibria in the agent normal form of the game (because in the agent normal form each agent plays only one time).
Therefore, given that the agent normal form is a normal form game, it has a normal form BRM equilibrium; this normal form BRM equilibrium bijectively corresponds to a local BRM equilibrium (each strategy of an agent of player 1 becomes the local strategy of a type of player 1, and each strategy of an agent of player 2 becomes the local strategy of player 2 after observing a message). It derives that each signaling game has at least one local BRM equilibrium.
The existence of at least one new normal form BRM equilibrium and of at least one new local BRM equilibrium immediately derives from the fact that the sets of new normal form and new local BRM equilibria respectively include the sets of normal form and local BRM equilibria.
Let us finally conclude on the fact that it would be worth developing a local approach in more general extensive form games, especially games in which a same player has to play at several information sets. These games include traditional games like the centipede game and the prisoner's dilemma. More generally it would be worth looking for the BRM equilibria in these traditional games because the new consistency behind BRM concepts allows to get new solutions that can better fit with real observed behavior. And so on, till to t n-1 who can at most play three prices, p n-2 ,H n-1 and p n-1 . Hence t n plays p n-1 and she can at most play 2 different prices, p n-1 and H n . The number (2n-1) follows.
Let us finally prove that in a PBE path in which each type of seller gets a positive payoff, the buyer' s payoff can only be equal to 0. It follows from the positivity of the payoff of each type of seller that the consumer accepts each equilibrium price with a positive probability. Let us suppose that the buyer accepts an equilibrium price p* with probability 1. In that case, p* is necessarily the lowest price played in the equilibrium. Call t i the highest type playing p*. Necessarily, p*≥h i and t i plays p* with at most probability 1. Yet assumption (b) ensures that follows that the consumer refuses p* (a contradiction), unless i is equal to 1. Yet, in that case, p* is necessarily equal to H 1 and the buyer' s payoff is null . Hence each price different from H 1 is accepted with a probability lower than 1. It follows that the buyer is indifferent between buying and not buying at every equilibrium price different from H 1 . This means that his payoff is equal to 0 for any equilibrium price.
In fact the buyer' s payoff is null in any PBE of the studied experience good model. Consider any price p* of the PBE path. Either p is refused with probability 1, in which case the buyer' s payoff is null. Either it is accepted with a positive probability, in which case the preceding observations ensure that the buyer' s payoff is also equal to 0.
Appendix 3
It is immediate that in a PBE the probability of accepting a price strictly decreases in the price, because, if else, the types who play a low price would be better off switching to a high price.
Let us now turn to the generalized simplified experience good model with n prices p i , i from 1 to n, with h i <p i <H i , i from 1 to n, which satisfies assumption (b), and in which the consumer always accepts p 1 and no type of seller plays a price lower than her reservation price. We prove that in this context, each type t i , i from 1 to n, in the normal form BRM equilibrium, plays each price p j , j from i to n, with a positive probability.
To do so, one first proves that in a normal form BRM equilibrium, the consumer's strategy (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is played with positive probability. Let us suppose the contrary, i.e. that (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is played with probability 0. In that case, the consumer necessarily accepts a price p j , j>1, with positive probability. Suppose that p k is the highest price accepted with positive probability. If k<n-1, this means that the consumer plays the strategy (A/p 1 , ./p i , A/p k , R/p j ) with positive probability, with i from 1 to k-1, j from k+1 to n, and the point meaning either A or R. A seller's best reply to this strategy is (p k /t i ,p n /t j ), i from 1 to k and j from k+1 to n; this strategy is therefore also played with positive probability. The consumer's strategy (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is a best reply to (p k /t i ,p n /t j ), i from 1 to k and j from k+1 to n. It follows that (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is also played with positive probability, a contradiction to our assumption.
If k=n-1, the consumer plays the strategy (A/p 1 , ./p i , A/p n-1 , R/p n ) with positive probability, with i from 1 to n-2, the point meaning either A or R. A seller's best reply to this strategy is (p n-1 /t i ,p n /t n ), i from 1 to n-1; hence this strategy is played with positive probability. The consumer's strategy (A/p 1 ,R/p j ,A/p n ), j from 2 to n-1, is a best reply to (p n-1 /t i ,p n /t n ), i from 1 to n-1; hence it is played with positive probability. The seller's strategy (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n, is a best reply to (A/p 1 ,R/p j ,A/p n ), j from 2 to n-1; hence it is played with positive probability. Finally (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is a best reply to (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n. It follows that (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is played with positive probability, a contradiction to our assumption. If k=n, the consumer plays the strategy (A/p 1 , ./p i , A/p n ) with positive probability, with i from 1 to n-1, the point meaning either A or R. A seller's best reply to this strategy is (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n; this strategy is therefore played with positive probability. The consumer's strategy (A/p 1 ,R/p j ) j from 2 to n, is a best reply to (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n. It follows that (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is played with positive probability, a contradiction to our assumption.
Let us now observe that: The seller's strategy (p i /t i ), i from 1 to n is a best reply to the buyer's strategy (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n. In turn (A/p 1 ,R/p j ), j from 2 to n, is a best reply to the seller's strategy (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n. In turn, (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n, is the best reply to the buyer's strategy (A/p i ), i from 1 to n. Finally, in turn, (A/p i ), i from 1 to n, is the best reply to the seller's strategy (p i /t i ) i from 1 to n. It follows from this circularity in best replies, and from the fact that (A/p 1 ,R/p j ) j from 2 to n, is played with positive probability, that each of the above mentioned strategy is played with positive probability. Hence, given that (p i /t i ), i from 1 to n and (p n /t i ), i from 1 to n, are played with positive probability, each type t i , i from 1 to n, plays both p i and p n with positive probability.
One also observes that: Take any j lower than n. The seller's strategy (p j /t i , p k /t k ), is the best reply to the consumer's strategy (A/p i , R/p k ), i from 1 to j and k from j+1 to n.
